Philosophy Talk: Skepticism and Solipsism

Grace Helton on Skepticism and Solipsism. Grace is a postdoc at the Princeton Society of Fellows working in philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and epistemology.

 

Abstract: David Chalmers has argued that there are no (probable) skeptical scenarios because in all such scenarios, most of our beliefs would turn out to be true. This is because most of our beliefs are about things like tables, chairs, and football games, and in putative skeptical scenarios, there will be tables, chairs, and football games; it’s just that such things will have a different underlying nature than we supposed them to have. I accept Chalmers’ claim that many putative skeptical scenarios are not genuine skeptical scenarios, but I reject his claim that there are no (probable) skeptical scenarios. I argue in particular that scenarios in which you are the only sentient creature are skeptical scenarios. In such scenarios, a surprisingly vast range of your beliefs will turn out to be false, including many of your beliefs about: interpersonal relations, political realities, social structures, historical facts, artistic movements, and cultural traditions.